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Christopher N. Franciose*
Abstract: As Western corporations continue to expand internationally 
in search of natural resources and greater economies of scale, they in-
creasingly ªnd themselves operating amidst the political unrest and so-
cial conºict that afºicts many developing nations. In such contexts, 
multinational enterprises often turn a blind eye to human rights abuses, 
and in the worst cases, become active participants. As a result, many 
have called for a global system of corporate governance. This Note fo-
cuses on the OECD’s framework for inºuencing corporate behavior in-
ternationally: the “OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.” Af-
ter explaining the mechanics of the Guidelines, this Note provides a 
critical analysis of the United States’ implementation by comparing U.S. 
methods with those of two other adherent states—the Netherlands and 
France. Ultimately, the Note concludes that U.S. practices leave much 
room for improvement and offers suggestions for a more robust imple-
mentation of the Guidelines. 
Introduction 
 In late 1990, a damage-claims inspector set out to make a routine 
trip to an oil well in Aceh, a remote province of Indonesia.1 While driv-
ing on the road leading to “Well D2,” he noticed several pigs rooting 
around in what appeared to be recently bulldozed soil.2 Upon closer 
examination, the unnamed inspector made a gruesome discovery: ‘‘the 
pigs were rooting down there on a hip bone, around the white knobbly 
part.”3 What he observed were “obviously human bones.’’4 Local villag-
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ers, when asked about the remains, told him that Indonesian security 
forces had captured and executed Acehenese villagers in retaliation for 
an attack on a nearby settlement which housed oil and natural gas 
company employees.5 Along the same road just a few months later, a 
soil testing team found a shoe while excavating about two-and-a-half 
miles from the D2 well.6 A machine operator jumped out, picked up 
the shoe, and collapsed in shock when he realized it was still on the 
foot of a detached human leg.7
 Stories like these serve as troubling reminders of the intense suf-
fering and horriªc human rights violations individuals endure in de-
veloping nations around the world.8 Yet, in the case of Aceh, there is an 
added element of concern for the international community: the events 
described above occurred on land owned in part by the multinational 
enterprise Mobil Oil, now ExxonMobil.9 Although violence in Aceh has 
waned in the wake of the tsunami that struck Indonesia in 2004,10 over 
ªfteen years of human rights atrocities serve as a disturbing example of 
what can happen when multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) operate in 
the context of third-world political conºict, repression, and extreme 
poverty, often without the check of domestic monitoring and law en-
forcement.11 ExxonMobil, as well as Unocal, Nike, Dole, Chevron, and 
many other multinational enterprises, have all been criticized for pro-
viding “poster cases” for the negative consequences of globalization and 
the shift towards transnational production.12
 The international community has responded to the unique prob-
lem of inºuencing the behavior of multinational corporations with re-
spect to human rights, as well as other areas of concern such as bribery, 
labor rights violations, and environmental degradation, in a variety of 
ways.13 This note focuses on the corporate governance approach of the 
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
Speciªcally, it seeks to provide a critical analysis of the United States’s 
implementation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(the Guidelines) through its primary implementation mechanism: the 
national contact point (NCP). This Note ªrst provides a backdrop to 
assessing implementation successes and failures by explaining exactly 
what the Guidelines are, how they address structural limitations of the 
international legal system, and the implementation mechanisms they 
include. Next, this Note considers the strengths and weaknesses of the 
U.S. NCP approach to implementation by comparing U.S. practices 
with those of two other adherents to the Guidelines—the Netherlands 
and France. Finally, the Note concludes by offering suggestions for im-
proving implementation by way of the national contact point. 
I. Background and History 
 With the help human rights advocates, individual torture victims 
such as those in Indonesia, have made various attempts to inºuence the 
behavior of Western-based multinational corporations acting abroad.14 
Some alleged victims, including a group of Acehnese villagers, have 
brought tort actions in U.S. federal court under the Alien Tort Claims 
Act.15 A shareholder resolution on the issue of ExxonMobil’s role in 
the violence in Aceh was also ªled in 2001, receiving almost 8 percent 
of the votes cast.16 Yet, at the international level, voluntary principles 
have been the primary vehicle for inºuencing MNE actions with re-
spect to human rights.17 In particular, individual states, non-
governmental organizations such as Amnesty International, and inter-
governmental organizations such as the United Nations (U.N.) and the 
OECD have promulgated guidelines and codes of conduct.18 These 
rules and principles, although voluntary and non-binding, represent 
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the international community’s most widely-accepted attempt at achiev-
ing some level of global corporate governance.19
A. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
 In 1976, all thirty OECD members, plus nine non-member coun-
tries, adopted the Guidelines as “recommendations addressed by gov-
ernments to multinational enterprises operating in or from adhering 
countries . . . .”20 The Guidelines set forth voluntary principles and 
standards for responsible corporate conduct that are not enforceable at 
law.21 At their broadest level, the Guidelines seek to ensure that MNEs 
act in accordance with government policies, and in doing so, “strength-
en the basis of mutual conªdence between enterprises and the societies 
in which they operate, to help improve the foreign investment climate 
and to enhance [MNEs’] contribution to sustainable development 
. . . .”22 Speciªc areas addressed in the Guidelines include: information 
disclosure, employment and industrial relations, the environment, bri-
bery, consumer interests, science and technology, competition, and 
taxation.23 There is no section solely dedicated to human rights viola-
tions, but MNEs are asked in the general policies chapter to “respect 
the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent with the 
host government’s international obligations and commitments.”24
 The Guidelines are designed to inºuence the behavior of a spe-
ciªc type of non-state actor—the multinational enterprise.25 As a pri-
vate entity, a MNE cannot become a party to a binding instrument, i.e., 
a treaty under international law, for the very reason that it is not a state; 
only states may be parties to treaties.26 The Guidelines address this 
structural problem by requiring adhering states to promote a set of 
principles, rather than seeking to hold corporations directly accountable 
for their actions.27 Nevertheless, as a non-binding instrument, the 
                                                                                                                      
19 See Amnesty Int’l USA, Business and Human Rights, supra note 18; U.N. Global 
Compact, supra note 13; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of 
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21 See OECD Guidelines, supra note 13, at 17. 
22 Id. at 15. 
23 Id. at 20–27. 
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26 See Mark Janis, An Introduction to International Law 18 (4th ed. 2003). 
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Guidelines cannot be enforced through legal action against a MNE or 
applied as law in any international court.28 Moreover, the Guidelines 
do not apply to multinationals that are based in a non-adhering nation 
and operate in a non-adhering nation or nations.29
B. Implementation of the Guidelines 
 The institutional framework for promoting and implementing the 
Guidelines consists of two major elements: NCPs and the OECD’s 
Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises 
(CIME).30 NCPs are at the heart of implementation: they promote the 
Guidelines, handle inquiries about their application, and help resolve 
problems that arise in speciªc instances of implementation.31 As a prac-
tical matter, NCPs frequently handle complaints submitted against 
companies for alleged violations of the Guidelines’ principles.32 In ad-
dition, NCPs gather information on national experiences with the 
Guidelines, meet annually to share experiences, and report annually to 
the CIME.33
 The CIME is responsible for overseeing the effectiveness of the 
OECD Guidelines, clarifying the meaning of speciªc provisions, review-
ing and exchanging views on the Guidelines, and responding to various 
requests from adhering nations.34 Additionally, the Guidelines are pe-
riodically reviewed in accordance with terms set by the CIME.35 These 
reviews tend to provide guidance to NCPs; establish mechanisms for 
promoting transparency, accountability, and best practices; consult the 
business community, labor organizations, and non-member countries 
for feedback on ways to improve the Guidelines and their implementa-
tion; and incorporate public opinion input on MNE governance of-
fered via the Internet.36
                                                                                                                      
28 See id. 
29 Examples of nations which do not adhere to the Guidelines include China, Malaysia, 
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OECD_Watch_5_years_on.pdf [hereinafter Five Years On]. 
30 OECD Guidelines, supra note 13, at 32. 
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chael K. Addo ed., 1999). 
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II. Discussion of Issues 
A. OECD National Contact Points 
 As mentioned above, NCPs are the primary mechanism for im-
plementing the OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises.37 Most 
importantly, they must “further the effectiveness of the Guidelines” and 
“operate in accordance with core criteria of visibility, accessibility, 
transparency and accountability . . . .”38 The Guidelines additionally 
require that all NCPs be functional equivalents, although individual 
NCPs retain some discretion as to the exact manner in which they pro-
vide information, promote awareness, and handle implementation in 
speciªc instances.39 NCPs also may take a variety of institutional forms, 
but are most often composed of a government ofªce headed by a sen-
ior government ofªcial.40 For instance, the U.S. NCP is the Ofªce of 
Investment Affairs, a part of the Bureau of Economic and Business Af-
fairs located in the Department of State.41 In contrast to the U.S. insti-
tutional arrangement, other adhering nations such as the Netherlands 
and France use interdepartmental ofªces, which assign different gov-
ernment ministries various bureaucratic roles.42
 NCPs must engage in promotional and informational activities, as 
well as encourage implementation of the Guidelines in speciªc in-
stances.43 Promotional activities may be as simple as posting a web link 
to the OECD Guidelines on a national government website, but many 
NCPs have been more proactive in their approach.44 For instance, the 
American, Swedish, Korean, Polish, Spanish, Hungarian, Canadian, 
German, Australian, and British NCPs have all trained their embassy 
and consular staffs in compliance and application of the Guidelines.45 
The Canadian NCP has sent representatives to appear before the Par-
liamentary Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International Devel-
                                                                                                                      
37 See id. 
38 Id. at 35. 
39 Id. at 35,60. 
40 See id. at 35. 
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43 OECD Guidelines, supra note 13, at 35–36. 
44 Report by the Chair, supra note 42, at 8; OECD Guidelines, supra note 13, at 35. 
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opment, and the Italian NCP cooperated with the Milan Chamber of 
Commerce to offer a training course for public utility workers.46
 Implementation in speciªc instances has been the most important 
and visible role for NCPs in recent years.47 As amended in 2000, the 
OECD Guidelines state that NCPs will “contribute to the resolution of 
issues that arise relating to implementation of the Guidelines in speciªc 
instances” by: (1) making an initial assessment as to whether the is-
sue(s) raised merits further examination; (2) offering good ofªces for 
the parties involved; (3) issuing a statement if an agreement is not 
reached and makeing recommendations on how the Guidelines should 
be implemented; (4) protecting sensitive business and other informa-
tion; and (5) makeing publicly available the results of the implementa-
tion proceedings without violating due conªdentiality.48 It is vital that 
NCPs provide a “forum for discussion” and facilitate “access to consen-
sual and non-adversarial means, such as conciliation or mediation, to 
assist in dealing with the issues.”49 They must consider requests for im-
plementation brought by non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), 
employee and labor organizations, representatives from corporations, 
and other concerned parties.50 In most cases, issues will be addressed 
by the NCP in whose country the issue has arisen, although coopera-
tion between NCPs is encouraged by the Guidelines.51
B. Implementation in Speciªc Instances by the U.S., Dutch, and  
French National Contact Points 
 Sixteen requests for implementation in speciªc instances have 
been ªled with the U.S. NCP since June of 2000, when the NCP 
mechanism ªrst was established by amendment to the Guidelines.52 
Requests for implementation are usually initiated by way of complaints 
in letter form, addressed to the NCP and sent by a concerned party 
such as a trade union or NGO.53 These sixteen instances represent the 
greatest number ªled with any of the thirty-nine adherent countries.54 
However, extremely brief descriptions of only half of those instances— 
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whether actively taken up by the U.S. NCP or not—have been made 
available by the United States for publication in OECD reports on 
Guideline-related activities.55 As a result, the data available for analysis 
of U.S. implementation is extremely scarse.56 The names of the parties 
requesting implementation are often not revealed in U.S. NCP or 
OECD documents, although various NGOs sometimes indicate in their 
own public materials that they have made requests for implementa-
tion.57 Moreover, the U.S. NCP routinely withholds company names 
and details pertaining to complaints, and does not make its annual re-
ports to the CIME publicly available.58
 Two of the eight total instances submitted to the OECD for publi-
cation were classiªed as “ongoing” as of June 2005, leaving a mere six 
published cases where the U.S. NCP has concluded its involvement.59 
As a result, these six completed cases provide a weak basis, but the only 
available one, for an assessment of U.S. NCP implementation successes 
and failures.60 Further frustrating the analysis is the fact that the U.S. 
NCP did not issue a ªnal statement explaining what resolution had 
been achieved and how the NCP had contributed to that solution in 
any of the six concluded cases.61 Rather, in half of those cases, it simply 
recorded that the “parties reached an agreement.”62 In the remaining 
instances, the U.S. NCP determined either that a U.N. panel had ade-
quately addressed all issues, that a U.N. Security Resolution was 
sufªcient, or that the parties’ issues were being addressed appropriately 
through “other means.”63
 All but one recorded instance dealt with issues arising under the 
“Employment and Industrial Relations” section of the OECD Guide-
lines (excluding the issue addressed by a U.N. Security Resolution dis-
cussed above), suggesting that the scope of U.S. NCP implementation 
activities is extremely limited.64 Speciªcally, these requests involved 
questions of freedom of association, collective bargaining, and em-
ployee representation.65 Although it is not stated in the OECD June 2005 
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Report by the Chair, it can reasonably be inferred that most, if not all, of 
the employee and industrial relations implementation requests were 
ªled by trade unions.66 The single remaining instance that did not fall 
under that section touched on three different chapters of the Guide-
lines: “General Policies,” “Information and Disclosure” and “Combat-
ing Bribery.”67 However, this particular instance involved a request to 
investigate the conduct of an international ship registry, and the U.S. 
NCP simply found that the relevant issues had been “effectively ad-
dressed through other appropriate means . . . .”68 Thus, the U.S. NCP 
cannot credibly claim to have brokered a resolution between a MNE 
and complainant outside of the realm of employment and industrial 
relations conºicts.69
 The data available on the activities of the Netherlands NCP is simi-
larly scarce.70 The OECD’s June 2005 Report by the Chair provides brief 
records of the Dutch NCP’s involvement in fourteen speciªc in-
stances.71 Twelve of these cases have been classiªed as concluded, but 
agreements were reached in only ªve.72 Thus, the Dutch NCP can be 
said to have successfully brokered settlements in roughly ªve cases of 
speciªc implementation to date.73 Additionally, the Dutch NCP issued 
joint press releases with the parties involved in a sixth case, and a 
statement discussing lessons learned and a travel advisory were released 
in two other instances.74 These public statements, although not neces-
sarily evidence of the Dutch NCP’s positive inºuence, at the very least 
helped further the NCP’s goal of meeting the openness and transpar-
ency requirements set forth in the Guidelines.75 In another ªve con-
cluded cases, the Dutch NCP determined that the issue involved did 
not merit further examination for various reasons, including a “lack of 
an investment nexus” or because formal legal proceedings had resolved 
the concerns.76 The twelfth concluded case simply required that the 
                                                                                                                      
66 Five Years On, supra note 29, at 33; see Report by the Chair, supra note 42, at 55–
56. 
67 Report by the Chair, supra note 42, at 55–56. 
68 Id. at 56 
69 See id. at 55–56. 
70 See id. at 51–53. 
71 Id. 
72 Report by the Chair, supra note 42, at 51–53. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
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Netherlands NCP act as a mediator between a Dutch NGO and the 
Chilean NCP.77
 The French NCP has been the third-most active in taking up spe-
ciªc instances for consideration, cataloguing nine of twelve total cases 
in the OECD report.78 Five of the nine recorded cases have been con-
cluded, and in only one of those ªve has a ªnal agreement been 
reached by the parties.79 However, the French NCP did issue press 
releases in relation to four concluded instances, furthering the 
OECD’s goal of transparency for NCP implementation activities.80 
Lastly, the scope of French implementation has been limited to mostly 
employment and industrial relations cases, much like U.S. and Dutch 
activities.81
III. Analysis 
 Although the information available concerning speciªc activities 
of the U.S. NCP is minimal, indications ªve years after the establish-
ment of the NCP implementation mechanism suggest that there is 
much room for improvement.82 An extrapolative analysis of the most 
active NCPs—the U.S., Dutch and French—reveals that all NCPs 
probably have had a limited impact on MNE behavior.83 The total 
number of cases the three nations have actively undertaken is quite 
small, and implementation in areas outside of labor relations has not 
been substantial.84 The weak cumulative effect of NCP action can be, in 
part, attributed to the inherent limitations of the Guidelines and the 
associated difªculty of altering the behavior of private actors in the in-
ternational arena.85 However, the U.S. NCP’s approach has some severe 
shortcomings even when measured against the Guidelines’ own re-
quirements for NCPs.86
                                                                                                                      
77 Id. at 52. 
78 Id. at 14, 47–48. 
79 Id. at 47–48. 
80 See id. 
81 Report by the Chair, supra note 42, at 47–48, 51–53, 55–56. 
82 See Five Years On, supra note 29, at 5; see Report by the Chair, supra note 42, at 
47-48, 51-53, 55-56. 
83 See Five Years On, supra note 29, at 5; see Report by the Chair, supra note 42, at 
43–56. 
84 See Five Years On, supra note 29, at 47–48, 51–53, 55–56. 
85 See id. at 5, 7. 
86 See Report by the Chair, supra note 42, at 47–48, 51–53, 55–56; OECD Guide-
lines, supra note 13, at 36. 
2007] Implementation of OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 233 
 A comparative analysis of U.S., Dutch, and French NCP activities 
shows that the United States has primarily failed to “operate in accor-
dance with [the] core criteri[on] of . . . transparency . . . .”87 The very 
problem of a lack of openness has made it difªcult both to assess why 
the U.S. NCP has failed to bring about settlements between parties in 
failed cases, and how success was achieved in resolved cases.88 What is 
clear, however, is that the U.S. NCP, at a minimum, should reach a 
level of transparency achieved by the Dutch NCP and thus better meet 
its core responsibilities under the Guidelines.89
 As Appendix A demonstrates, the U.S. NCP has opted to publish 
summaries of only half of the instances ªled with it.90 Rather than err 
on the side of openness as the Guidelines suggest, the U.S. NCP nei-
ther releases speciªcs concerning cases it has addressed, nor pub-
lishes its annual reports to the CIME.91 Moreover, the U.S. NCP has 
made it clear that it has no intention of ever acknowledging that a 
particular MNE has breached the Guidelines, regardless of the egre-
giousness of the behavior.92 It appears that the U.S. NCP’s emphasis 
on maintaining the conªdentiality of the parties involved has been 
taken to such an extreme that it far outweighs any value placed on 
open and transparent NCP procedures.93
 Although under the Guidelines NCPs have ºexibility as to how 
they handle implementation in speciªc instances, this does not justify 
institutional laziness on the part of the U.S. NCP, or worse, willful dis-
regard for Guideline requirements.94 The “Procedural Guidance” sec-
tion of the OECD Guidelines states that “if the parties involved do not 
reach agreement on the issues raised, [the NCP will] issue a state-
ment, and make recommendations as appropriate, on the implemen-
tation of the Guidelines.”95 As discussed above, OECD annual reports 
indicate that the U.S. NCP has never issued a ªnal statement concern-
ing an instance of speciªc implementation, yet there are no sanctions 
                                                                                                                      
87 OECD Guidelines, supra note 13, at 35; Five Years On, supra note 29, at 33; Re-
port by the Chair, supra note 42, at 47–48, 51–53, 55–56. 
88 See Report by the Chair, supra note 42, at 55–56. 
89 See Five Years On, supra note 29, at 33; Report by the Chair, supra note 42, at 51–
53, 55–56. 
90 See Report by the Chair, supra note 42, at 55–56. 
91 See Five Years On, supra note 29, at 25, 33. 
92 Id. at 23. 
93 See id. at 25 
94 See OECD Guidelines, supra note 13, at 35. 
95 Id. at 36. 
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for such inaction provided for in the Guidelines.96 Moreover, the U.S. 
NCP website does not provide access to or make mention of any sort 
of press release or ªnal report relating to an implementation case.97
 In direct contrast, the Dutch NCP has issued at least four ªnal 
statements after concluding its involvement in implementation in-
stances.98 Speciªcally, in December of 2002, a resolution was negoti-
ated and a joint statement issued by the Dutch NCP, Adidas, and the 
India Committee on the Netherlands (“ICN”) concerning an issue 
stemming from Adidas’s outsourcing of soccer ball production in In-
dia.99 The joint statement explained the relevant issue (Adidas’s con-
formity with the OECD Guidelines), discussed how the Dutch NCP 
helped each party clarify its point of view, and ªnally, stipulated the 
common ground and agreed upon changes that each Adidas and the 
ICN will make.100 In this case, the Dutch NCP fulªlled its responsibil-
ity under the Guidelines to make public the results of an implementa-
tion proceeding and in doing so, allowed the concerned public and 
complainant NGO to see that it had provided good ofªces for an in-
terest group and MNE in dispute.101 Thus, the Dutch NCP provided a 
“forum for discussion,” facilitated “access to consensual and non-
adversarial means . . . to assist in dealing with the issues,” and ulti-
mately brought about a solution to a corporate governance problem 
in the case of Adidas and India.102
 In light of the more transparent and seemingly more effective 
practices of the Dutch NCP, it is clear that the U.S. NCP would beneªt 
from changes to its approach to implementation in speciªc in-
stances.103 As the analysis above suggests, the U.S. NCP must work to 
fundamentally increase the openness of its operations by issuing 
statements after concluding its involvement in disputes, whether a 
resolution has been reached or not.104 If a solution has not been 
reached, the U.S. NCP should explain why, as the Guidelines require, 
                                                                                                                      
96 Report by the Chair, supra note 42, at 55–56. See generally OECD Guidelines, su-
pra note 13. 
97 See Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, supra note 41. 
98 See Report by the Chair, supra note 42, at 51–53. 
99 See id. at 51. 
100 Netherlands Nat’l Contact Point, Joint Statement by the NCP, Adidas and 
ICN: Agreement between ICN and Adidas in NCP Procedure 1–3 (2002), http://www. 
oecd.org/dataoecd/33/43/2489243.pdf [herinafter Netherlands Nat’l Contact Point]. 
101 See id. 
102 OECD Guidelines, supra note 13, at 36; see Netherlands Nat’l Contact Point, 
supra note 101. 
103 See Five Years On, supra note 29, at 33. 
104 See id. 
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so that future complainants and corporations can learn from past mis-
takes.105 The quality and detail of such public releases also must 
sufªciently allow outside observers and interested parties such as U.S.-
based MNEs and NGOs to understand how implementation proceed-
ings work.106 If the NCP implementation mechanism is to have any 
real impact on MNE behavior, corporations and potential complain-
ants must understand exactly how conªdentiality will be protected, 
when and how mediation shall proceed, and what beneªts they stand 
to receive by reaching out to an NCP for assistance.107
 Moreover, the U.S. NCP should work to increase the public nature 
of its implementation proceedings so that it can employ the “mobiliza-
tion of shame” in order to affect corporate behavior.108 The more nega-
tive publicity and NGO scrutiny to which corporations are subject, the 
more likely they are to change their undesired practices.109 The non-
binding and discretionary nature of the Guidelines makes public criti-
cism all the more important as a tool for bringing about corporate re-
form.110 Although the conªdentiality of sensitive business information 
must be maintained as the Guidelines stipulate, the U.S. NCP must 
work to strike a better balance between conªdentiality and public ac-
countability required for the mobilization of shame.111
Conclusion 
 In a world where MNEs are often faced with a choice between em-
ploying responsible business practices and suffering a reduction in 
proªt margins due to competitive disadvantage, voluntary guidelines 
such as the OECD Guidelines may simply be inadequate. While the 
voluntary aspect of the Guidelines contributes to their broad accep-
tance and addresses the problem of inºuencing private actors through 
international law, it also means that corporations can “opt out” of com-
pliance if it makes economic sense to do so. Nonetheless, without a vi-
able system for instituting binding, global business regulations, volun-
tary guidelines and principles represent the best method presently 
available for altering MNE behavior. Therefore, it is important that the 
                                                                                                                      
105 See id; see OECD Guidelines, supra note 13, at 36. 
106 See Five Years On, supra note 29, at 33. 
107 See id. 
108 See Robert Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs?: Human Rights Nongovernmen-
tal Organizations and the Case for Regulation, 10 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 261, 290 (2004). 
109 See id. 
110 See id. See generally OECD Guidelines, supra note 13. 
111 See OECD Guidelines, supra note 13, at 61. 
236 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 30:223 
U.S. NCP meet its responsibilities under the Guidelines and thus set an 
example for other OECD members and Guidelines adherents. In-
creased transparency and more all-around effort on the part of the U.S. 
NCP must be employed if the United States has any hope of making the 
OECD Guidelines a truly useful tool for inºuencing corporate practices 
around the globe. 
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